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CHR 2.0 · Proposal, not live

A fixed daily mint. Providers first.

125,000 CHR a day, forever, paid to the people running the network before anyone else. What is left over is split between the Foundation and a pool that rewards stakers and burns the rest. Governance can cut the mint. It can never raise it.

The simulator is a page of its own: set the assumptions yourself and see what the supply does.

The September 2026 proposal, in full. Activation still requires a staker veto window and a two-thirds vote of system providers. Nothing here is investment advice.

The short version

Four rules.

125,000 CHRminted every day, forever. A fixed amount, not a rate, so the rate falls on its own: 4.66% in year one to 2.47% by year twenty.
Providers firstthat mint plus network fees pay the people running the network before anything else. Whatever is left over is the only thing anyone argues about.
Split 50/50half the leftovers to the Foundation, half to a Community Pool that pays stakers 3% a year and burns a thousandth of itself daily.
Down onlygovernance can cut the mint, to zero if it wants. It can never raise it. That is enforced at the protocol layer, not by promise.
Before the proposal

CHR has never been issued by the protocol.

Every token in circulation was released from an allocation fixed in 2019, and that release finishes in 2026, which is the problem the draft exists to solve.

WhenWhatDetail
2019Token saleCHR is sold and listed. 130.6M of the 1B allocation is released by the end of the year.
May 202021.9M CHR burnedA single burn takes the maximum supply from 1,000,000,000 to 978,064,789. It has not moved since.
July 2024Mainnet launchChromia ships with independent providers and L1 anchoring. Provider compensation starts drawing on the pre-allocated pool.
2026CHR 2.0, proposedThe last of the allocation is released, so supply sits at 978,064,789 with nothing left to unlock. That is where the draft begins.
01 · What changes

A security budget with a public rule.

The September proposal replaces pre-allocated provider funding with a fixed daily mint and one provider-first waterfall. System provider and dapp provider shares stay unchanged.

PropertyCurrent modelSeptember proposal
Provider fundingPre-allocated funds125,000 CHR/day plus network fees; providers paid first
Foundation mintDiscretionary mintRetired; no other mint path
Fee earmarks10% of notional cluster revenue to the Foundation; a further 10% resource-pool marginBoth removed; Foundation and Community Pool each receive half of the residual
Staking rewardFixed protocol staking yield3% baseline from the Community Pool, only while funded; provider passthrough unchanged
Supply policyExisting model continues unless ratifiedPerpetual fixed amount, lowerable only; automatic pool burn

September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified. Source: chromia.com/chr-2.

02 · Fixed issuance

The amount stays flat. The relative rate falls.

The protocol mints exactly 125,000 CHR per day: 45.625M per 365-day year, indefinitely. This is an amount, not a rate. Governance may lower it, including to zero, but can never raise it.

Daily mint125,000CHR/day, perpetual and lowerable
Year 1 gross rate4.66%On the no-burn path
Year 20 gross rate2.47%No taper schedule, no sunset
125,000 CHR/day · every yearAnnual gross rate: 4.66% → 2.47% (no burn)
20272031203620412046

Constant daily amount · declining annual rate on the no-burn path

Starting at 978,064,789 CHR, supply without any burn reaches 1,890.56M CHR in 2046. There is no terminal value: the upper bound grows by 125,000 CHR per day forever. Because the amount is fixed while supply grows, relative growth tends toward zero on its own.

Supply upper bound, year by year. Supply upper bound, if the Community Pool never burns.
After activationNo-burn supplyIncrease vs activationGross rate that year
Year 11,023,689,789 CHR+4.7%4.66%
Year 51,206,189,789 CHR+23.3%3.93%
Year 101,434,314,789 CHR+46.6%3.29%
Year 151,662,439,789 CHR+70.0%2.82%
Year 201,890,564,789 CHR+93.3%2.47%

September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified. Source: chromia.com/chr-2.

03 · The daily waterfall

Network operation is funded first.

Every day, issuance D and network fees F (container leases, provider registration and bridge charges) enter the same reward pool. Only what survives providers and carried debt is shared.

  1. Pay today’s providers. System providers, dapp providers and submitter reimbursements are computed exactly as today, including the passthrough share to delegating stakers.
  2. Clear carried debt. Any provider rewards the pool could not cover on an earlier day are settled before either surplus recipient gets anything.
  3. Split the residual equally. R = D + F − P. Half goes to the Chromia Foundation, half to the Community Pool. If P exceeds D + F the residual is zero and both receive nothing that day.

What the split looks like at each provider cost, taking fee revenue as zero for simplicity:

Provider payoutsFoundation per dayCommunity Pool per day
0% of D62,500 CHR62,500 CHR
25% of D46,875 CHR46,875 CHR
50% of D31,250 CHR31,250 CHR
75% of D15,625 CHR15,625 CHR
100% or more00

Fee revenue adds to both columns one-for-one with F/2. The old earmarks are gone: the 10% of notional cluster revenue that went to the Foundation, and a further 10% resource-pool margin, are both replaced by this split. The simulator defaults to $1.14M a year in provider payouts; at $0.05 per CHR that is 22.8M CHR, almost exactly the 50% row.

September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified. Source: chromia.com/chr-2.

04 · The Community Pool

No signing key. Two automatic rules.

The Community Pool is a protocol account. From activation its balance can leave only through the baseline staking reward and the automatic burn. Stake-weighted voting over grants and further distributions comes in a later upgrade; it adds options without removing the defaults.

  1. Baseline staking reward: 3% a year, while the pool is funded. Paid pro rata through the existing staking payout, out of the pool’s balance. It is a claim on the pool, never a mint. At roughly 60M CHR staked that costs about 1.8M CHR a year, against a pool inflow of up to 22.8M CHR a year. It replaces the current fixed protocol staking yield. An empty pool cannot pay it.
  2. Automatic burn: 1/1000 of the remaining balance, daily. After the reward is paid, the protocol burns a thousandth of what is left, every day. An untouched balance loses 30.59% over a year (1 − 0.999365). A pool stakers ignore shrinks toward zero rather than piling up. Until staker voting ships, these two defaults are the only ways funds leave the pool.

Net supply change is D − B. The burn can offset issuance outright only when F − P > D: fee revenue has to exceed provider payouts by more than the daily mint. Below that the pool slows supply growth but cannot reverse it. Because D is fixed, that threshold does not move with supply; adoption is the only variable that matters. And it is denominated in CHR, so a lower CHR price lowers the dollar amount needed.

The other side of that: fees and provider costs are both denominated in dollars. A higher CHR price turns the same dollar surplus into fewer CHR for the pool and retires fewer tokens, while a lower price raises the CHR cost of paying providers and can starve the pool entirely.

Fee surplus over provider costs at which the burn can fully offset issuance, before baseline rewards and pool timing:

What the threshold is at each CHR price
CHR priceRequired daily surplusPer year
$0.025$3,125$1.14M
$0.05$6,250$2.28M
$0.10$12,500$4.56M
$0.30$37,500$13.69M

September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified. Source: chromia.com/chr-2.

05 · Supply simulator

Set the assumptions. Watch the supply.

The daily mint is fixed, so what supply actually does turns on CHR price, cluster adoption, fee revenue and provider costs. None of those are settled by the proposal, which is why they are a model rather than a forecast. The two ends it can reach, though, are fixed.

  • Pessimistic bound, no-burn ceiling at 2046: 1,890.56M CHR. Where supply lands if nothing is ever burned. The Squeezed preset reaches it exactly: provider costs eat the whole mint, the residual is zero, nothing reaches the pool. It keeps rising by 125,000 CHR a day unless governance lowers D.
  • Optimistic bound: no floor. The pool burn is permanent and uncapped, and the reward it competes with is bounded at 3% of staked CHR. Nothing in the proposal stops supply falling, so the only floor is the one adoption puts there.
06 · Governance & commitments

A veto signal. A downward-only policy.

The existing system provider vote remains the only consensus mechanism. CHR 2.0 adds one minimal on-chain instrument: a staker veto signal. It records objections; it does not execute proposals.

A proposal opens a fixed-length veto window. Any staker can register a veto with one signed operation. At the close, objections are tallied on-chain, weighted by staked CHR. The draft does not specify the window length.

This is opt-out: silence counts as assent. There is no quorum logic, so low participation does not weaken the mandate. The tally binds socially, not in code. Providers are expected not to ratify above a published veto threshold, for example 20% of staked CHR; that example is not a final parameter.

A provider that ratifies over its own delegators’ recorded objections risks redelegation. After the veto window closes, activation requires approval from two-thirds of active system providers. There is no upgrade-flag fallback: if ratification fails, the current model continues unchanged.

  1. Fixed issuance. Exactly D CHR per day, and no other mint path. Total supply never exceeds S₀ + D × days since activation.
  2. Downward only. Governance may lower D, including to zero, but can never raise it.
  3. Providers first, surplus shared. Providers are paid before any other allocation. The residual is split equally; pool funds leave only through automatic defaults and, later, staker decisions.

Every permitted amendment makes policy stricter, cheaper or more transparent. None makes it looser. Later staker voting concerns surplus only, never provider compensation.

September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified. Source: chromia.com/chr-2.

07 · FAQ

The tradeoffs, openly.

This is a proposed mechanism for funding network operation. What it produces depends on adoption, costs and price.

Why is there no end date?

A sunset assumes fees can fund providers by a date that depends on adoption and cannot be known in advance. The draft chooses a perpetual, lowerable, provider-first mint instead. Without burns, supply grows without limit; a fixed amount becomes a smaller fraction of a growing supply.

Is the 3% baseline staking reward guaranteed?

No. It is paid from the Community Pool only while funds are available. It is a transfer to stakers, not a mint or a burn, so it stays in supply. Provider reward passthrough remains unchanged.

What if the CHR price falls sharply?

USD provider costs can consume the entire mint. Both surplus recipients then starve, the baseline reward goes unpaid if the pool is empty, and provider debt accumulates. The existing per-node CHR reward cap and governance revision of cost parameters are the draft’s mitigations. The Squeezed preset illustrates this risk and sits on the no-burn ceiling.

What if adoption stalls?

The pool can accumulate minted CHR without fee revenue behind it. The automatic burn bounds that accumulation, but does not guarantee deflation. Perpetual issuance continues unless governance lowers it.

Where could new fees come from?

Today fees are almost entirely container leases. The proposal covers network-operated storage, cross-chain communication, indexing and querying for dapps on any network, plus AI agent identity and reputation, public data storage and retrieval, attestation and audit trails. Small per-call, USD-denominated fees would join the same waterfall. Existing provider capacity keeps marginal cost low. These are directions, not specifications: no service, price or delivery date is promised.

Could staker governance be captured?

This risk arrives with the later voting upgrade. The proposal sets out participation floors, distribution caps, on-chain transparency and the veto signal as defences. Those participation floors concern future pool decisions, not the activation veto, which has no quorum. The pool holds only surplus, never provider compensation.

Can the Foundation rely on a fixed income?

No. Its income is half of the residual after providers and carried debt. Revenue, provider costs and CHR price can make that income volatile or zero. The discretionary Foundation mint and old fee earmarks are retired.

What does the simulator leave out?

The $12,371 annual revenue per cluster and the $1.14M of annual provider payouts are modelling assumptions — the proposal fixes neither, so both are yours to move. The revenue figure is a baseline, not a price sheet. The model uses annual steps and a fixed 60M CHR staked, without feedback between supply, price and adoption. It does not model the proposed new service fees separately. A path to zero supply is a mathematical boundary, not a plausible forecast.

Are the figures final?

Yes. This is the final September 2026 proposal, and the mechanism and every parameter in it are settled. Activation still requires the veto window and two-thirds system provider approval; without ratification, the current model remains in place.

CHR is a utility token for use within the Chromia ecosystem. This page describes a proposal, is educational, and is not investment advice.