A fixed daily mint.
Providers first.
125,000 CHR a day, forever, paid to the people running the network before anyone else. What is left over is split between the Foundation and a pool that rewards stakers and burns the rest. Governance can cut the mint. It can never raise it.
The simulator is a page of its own: set the assumptions yourself and see what the supply does.
The September 2026 proposal, in full. Activation still requires a staker veto window and a two-thirds vote of system providers. Nothing here is investment advice.
The short version
125,000 CHR — minted every day, forever. A fixed amount, not a rate — so the rate falls on its own, 4.66% in year one to 2.47% by year twenty.
Providers first — that mint plus network fees pay the people running the network before anything else. Whatever is left over is the only thing anyone argues about.
Split 50/50 — half the leftovers to the Foundation, half to a Community Pool that pays stakers 3% a year and burns a thousandth of itself daily.
Down only — governance can cut the mint, to zero if it wants. It can never raise it. That is enforced at the protocol layer, not by promise.
Before the proposal
CHR has never been issued by the protocol. Every token in circulation was released from an allocation fixed in 2019, and that release finishes in 2026 — which is the problem the draft exists to solve.
- 2019
Token sale
CHR is sold and listed. 130.6M of the 1B allocation is released by the end of the year.
- May 2020
21.9M CHR burned
A single burn takes the maximum supply from 1,000,000,000 to 978,064,789. It has not moved since.
- July 2024
Mainnet launch
Chromia ships with independent providers and L1 anchoring. Provider compensation starts drawing on the pre-allocated pool.
- 2026
CHR 2.0, proposed
The last of the allocation is released, so supply sits at 978,064,789 with nothing left to unlock. That is where the draft begins.
A security budget with a public rule.
The September proposal replaces pre-allocated provider funding with a fixed daily mint and one provider-first waterfall. System provider and dapp provider shares stay unchanged.
| Property | Current model | September proposal |
|---|---|---|
| Provider funding | Pre-allocated funds | 125,000 CHR/day plus network fees; providers paid first |
| Foundation mint | Discretionary mint | Retired; no other mint path |
| Fee earmarks | 10% of notional cluster revenue to the Foundation; a further 10% resource-pool margin | Both removed; Foundation and Community Pool each receive half of the residual |
| Staking reward | Fixed protocol staking yield | 3% baseline from the Community Pool, only while funded; provider passthrough unchanged |
| Supply policy | Existing model continues unless ratified | Perpetual fixed amount, lowerable only; automatic pool burn |
September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified.
The amount stays flat. The relative rate falls.
The protocol mints exactly 125,000 CHR per day: 45.625M per 365-day year, indefinitely. This is an amount, not a rate. Governance may lower it, including to zero, but can never raise it.
Starting at 978,064,789 CHR, supply without any burn reaches 1,890.56M CHR in 2046. There is no terminal value: the upper bound grows by 125,000 CHR per day forever. Because the amount is fixed while supply grows, relative growth tends toward zero on its own.
September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified.
Supply upper bound, year by year
| After activation | No-burn supply | Increase vs activation | Gross rate that year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | 1,023,689,789 CHR | +4.7% | 4.66% |
| Year 5 | 1,206,189,789 CHR | +23.3% | 3.93% |
| Year 10 | 1,434,314,789 CHR | +46.6% | 3.29% |
| Year 15 | 1,662,439,789 CHR | +70.0% | 2.82% |
| Year 20 | 1,890,564,789 CHR | +93.3% | 2.47% |
Network operation is funded first.
Every day, issuance D and network fees F enter the same reward pool — container leases, provider registration and bridge charges. Only what survives providers and carried debt is shared.
- 01
Pay today’s providers
System providers, dapp providers and submitter reimbursements are computed exactly as today, including the passthrough share to delegating stakers.
- 02
Clear carried debt
Any provider rewards the pool could not cover on an earlier day are settled before either surplus recipient gets anything.
- 03
Split the residual equally
R = D + F − P. Half goes to the Chromia Foundation, half to the Community Pool. If P exceeds D + F the residual is zero and both receive nothing that day.
What the split looks like at each provider cost
| Provider payouts | Foundation per day | Community Pool per day |
|---|---|---|
| 0% of D | 62,500 CHR | 62,500 CHR |
| 25% of D | 46,875 CHR | 46,875 CHR |
| 50% of D | 31,250 CHR | 31,250 CHR |
| 75% of D | 15,625 CHR | 15,625 CHR |
| 100% or more | 0 | 0 |
Fee revenue adds to both columns one-for-one with F/2. The old earmarks are gone: the 10% of notional cluster revenue that went to the Foundation, and a further 10% resource-pool margin, are both replaced by this split. The simulator defaults to $1.14M a year in provider payouts — at $0.05 per CHR that is 22.8M CHR, almost exactly the middle row below.
September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified.
No signing key. Two automatic rules.
The Community Pool is a protocol account. From activation its balance can leave only through the baseline staking reward and the automatic burn. Stake-weighted voting over grants and further distributions comes in a later upgrade; it adds options without removing the defaults.
- 01
Baseline staking reward
3% a year, while the pool is funded
- Paid pro rata through the existing staking payout, out of the pool’s balance. It is a claim on the pool, never a mint.
- At roughly 60M CHR staked that costs about 1.8M CHR a year, against a pool inflow of up to 22.8M CHR a year.
- It replaces the current fixed protocol staking yield. An empty pool cannot pay it.
- 02
Automatic burn
1/1000 of the remaining balance, daily
- After the reward is paid, the protocol burns a thousandth of what is left, every day.
- An untouched balance loses 30.59% over a year: 1 − 0.999³⁶⁵. A pool stakers ignore shrinks toward zero rather than piling up.
- Until staker voting ships, these two defaults are the only ways funds leave the pool.
Net supply change is D − B. The burn can offset issuance outright only when F − P > D: fee revenue has to exceed provider payouts by more than the daily mint. Below that the pool slows supply growth but cannot reverse it.
Because D is fixed, that threshold does not move with supply — adoption is the only variable that matters. And it is denominated in CHR, so a lower CHR price lowers the dollar amount needed. The mechanism is counter-cyclical, in the same way a fee burn is.
The other side of that: fees and provider costs are both denominated in dollars. A higher CHR price turns the same dollar surplus into fewer CHR for the pool and retires fewer tokens, while a lower price raises the CHR cost of paying providers and can starve the pool entirely. The simulator asks you for a price and a drift because the two pull in opposite directions.
What the threshold is at each CHR price
| CHR price | Required daily surplus | Per year |
|---|---|---|
| $0.025 | $3,125 | $1.14M |
| $0.05 | $6,250 | $2.28M |
| $0.10 | $12,500 | $4.56M |
| $0.30 | $37,500 | $13.69M |
September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified.
Set the assumptions. Watch the supply.
The daily mint is fixed, so what supply actually does turns on CHR price, cluster adoption, fee revenue and provider costs. None of those are settled by the proposal, which is why they are a model rather than a forecast. The two ends it can reach, though, are fixed.
Where supply lands if nothing is ever burned. The Squeezed preset reaches it exactly: provider costs eat the whole mint, the residual is zero, nothing reaches the pool. It is a dated figure, not a terminal one — the bound keeps rising by 125,000 CHR a day unless governance lowers D.
The pool burn is permanent and uncapped, and the reward it competes with is bounded at 3% of staked CHR. Nothing in the proposal stops supply falling, so the only floor is the one adoption puts there.
Price, adoption, fee revenue and provider costs are all yours to set. The link changes as you move them, so a scenario can be sent to someone rather than described.
A veto signal. A downward-only policy.
The existing system provider vote remains the only consensus mechanism. CHR 2.0 adds one minimal on-chain instrument: a staker veto signal. It records objections; it does not execute proposals.
A proposal opens a fixed-length veto window. Any staker can register a veto with one signed operation. At the close, objections are tallied on-chain, weighted by staked CHR. The draft does not specify the window length.
This is opt-out: silence counts as assent. There is no quorum logic, so low participation does not weaken the mandate. The tally binds socially, not in code. Providers are expected not to ratify above a published veto threshold, for example 20% of staked CHR; that example is not a final parameter.
A provider that ratifies over its own delegators’ recorded objections risks redelegation. After the veto window closes, activation requires approval from two-thirds of active system providers. There is no upgrade-flag fallback: if ratification fails, the current model continues unchanged.
Fixed issuance
Exactly D CHR per day, and no other mint path. Total supply never exceeds S₀ + D × days since activation.
Downward only
Governance may lower D, including to zero, but can never raise it.
Providers first, surplus shared
Providers are paid before any other allocation. The residual is split equally; pool funds leave only through automatic defaults and, later, staker decisions.
Every permitted amendment makes policy stricter, cheaper or more transparent. None makes it looser. Later staker voting concerns surplus only, never provider compensation.
September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified.
The tradeoffs, openly.
This is a proposed mechanism for funding network operation. What it produces depends on adoption, costs and price.
Disclaimer: CHR is a utility token for use within the Chromia ecosystem. This page describes a proposal, is educational, and is not investment advice.
September 2026 proposal. Figures are final; the proposal is not yet ratified.
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