# CHR 2.0 proposal: fixed daily issuance, providers first

> The September 2026 CHR 2.0 proposal: 125,000 CHR a day, providers paid first, the residual split between the Foundation and a Community Pool that pays stakers and burns. Not ratified.

Source: https://chromia.com/chr-2/

**CHR 2.0, a tokenomics proposal. A fixed daily mint. Providers first.**

125,000 CHR a day, forever, paid to the people running the network before anyone else. What is left over is split between the Foundation and a pool that rewards stakers and burns the rest. Governance can cut the mint. It can never raise it.

The September 2026 proposal, in full. Activation still requires a staker veto window and a two-thirds vote of system providers. Nothing here is investment advice. Supply simulator: /chr-2/simulator/

## Before the proposal

| When | What | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| 2019 | Token sale | CHR is sold and listed. 130.6M of the 1B allocation is released by the end of the year. |
| May 2020 | 21.9M CHR burned | A single burn takes the maximum supply from 1,000,000,000 to 978,064,789. It has not moved since. |
| July 2024 | Mainnet launch | Chromia ships with independent providers and L1 anchoring. Provider compensation starts drawing on the pre-allocated pool. |
| 2026 | CHR 2.0, proposed | The last of the allocation is released, so supply sits at 978,064,789 with nothing left to unlock. That is where the draft begins. |

## What changes

| Property | Current model | September proposal |
|---|---|---|
| Provider funding | Pre-allocated funds | 125,000 CHR/day plus network fees; providers paid first |
| Foundation mint | Discretionary mint | Retired; no other mint path |
| Fee earmarks | 10% of notional cluster revenue to the Foundation; a further 10% resource-pool margin | Both removed; Foundation and Community Pool each receive half of the residual |
| Staking reward | Fixed protocol staking yield | 3% baseline from the Community Pool, only while funded; provider passthrough unchanged |
| Supply policy | Existing model continues unless ratified | Perpetual fixed amount, lowerable only; automatic pool burn |

## Fixed issuance

125,000 CHR per day (45.625M per year), lowerable only. Without burns, supply reaches 1,890.56M CHR in 2046.

| After activation | No-burn supply | Increase vs activation | Gross rate that year |
|---|---|---|---|
| Year 1 | 1,023,689,789 CHR | +4.7% | 4.66% |
| Year 5 | 1,206,189,789 CHR | +23.3% | 3.93% |
| Year 10 | 1,434,314,789 CHR | +46.6% | 3.29% |
| Year 15 | 1,662,439,789 CHR | +70.0% | 2.82% |
| Year 20 | 1,890,564,789 CHR | +93.3% | 2.47% |

## The daily waterfall

1. Pay today’s providers.
2. Clear carried debt.
3. Split the residual R = D + F − P equally between the Chromia Foundation and the Community Pool.

| Provider payouts | Foundation per day | Community Pool per day |
|---|---|---|
| 0% of D | 62,500 CHR | 62,500 CHR |
| 25% of D | 46,875 CHR | 46,875 CHR |
| 50% of D | 31,250 CHR | 31,250 CHR |
| 75% of D | 15,625 CHR | 15,625 CHR |
| 100% or more | 0 | 0 |

## The Community Pool

- Baseline staking reward: 3% a year on roughly 60M staked CHR, only while the pool is funded.
- Automatic burn: 1/1000 of the remaining balance daily (30.59% a year).

| CHR price | Required daily surplus | Per year |
|---|---|---|
| $0.025 | $3,125 | $1.14M |
| $0.05 | $6,250 | $2.28M |
| $0.10 | $12,500 | $4.56M |
| $0.30 | $37,500 | $13.69M |

## Governance

A staker veto window (opt-out, stake-weighted, no quorum), then approval by two-thirds of active system providers. Issuance can only be lowered, never raised.

## FAQ

**Why is there no end date?** A sunset assumes fees can fund providers by a date that depends on adoption and cannot be known in advance. The draft chooses a perpetual, lowerable, provider-first mint instead. Without burns, supply grows without limit; a fixed amount becomes a smaller fraction of a growing supply.

**Is the 3% baseline staking reward guaranteed?** No. It is paid from the Community Pool only while funds are available. It is a transfer to stakers, not a mint or a burn, so it stays in supply. Provider reward passthrough remains unchanged.

**What if the CHR price falls sharply?** USD provider costs can consume the entire mint. Both surplus recipients then starve, the baseline reward goes unpaid if the pool is empty, and provider debt accumulates. The existing per-node CHR reward cap and governance revision of cost parameters are the draft’s mitigations. The Squeezed preset illustrates this risk and sits on the no-burn ceiling.

**What if adoption stalls?** The pool can accumulate minted CHR without fee revenue behind it. The automatic burn bounds that accumulation, but does not guarantee deflation. Perpetual issuance continues unless governance lowers it.

**Where could new fees come from?** Today fees are almost entirely container leases. The proposal covers network-operated storage, cross-chain communication, indexing and querying for dapps on any network, plus AI agent identity and reputation, public data storage and retrieval, attestation and audit trails. Small per-call, USD-denominated fees would join the same waterfall. Existing provider capacity keeps marginal cost low. These are directions, not specifications: no service, price or delivery date is promised.

**Could staker governance be captured?** This risk arrives with the later voting upgrade. The proposal sets out participation floors, distribution caps, on-chain transparency and the veto signal as defences. Those participation floors concern future pool decisions, not the activation veto, which has no quorum. The pool holds only surplus, never provider compensation.

**Can the Foundation rely on a fixed income?** No. Its income is half of the residual after providers and carried debt. Revenue, provider costs and CHR price can make that income volatile or zero. The discretionary Foundation mint and old fee earmarks are retired.

**What does the simulator leave out?** The $12,371 annual revenue per cluster and the $1.14M of annual provider payouts are modelling assumptions — the proposal fixes neither, so both are yours to move. The revenue figure is a baseline, not a price sheet. The model uses annual steps and a fixed 60M CHR staked, without feedback between supply, price and adoption. It does not model the proposed new service fees separately. A path to zero supply is a mathematical boundary, not a plausible forecast.

**Are the figures final?** Yes. This is the final September 2026 proposal, and the mechanism and every parameter in it are settled. Activation still requires the veto window and two-thirds system provider approval; without ratification, the current model remains in place.

Source: https://chromia.com/chr-2 (September 2026 proposal; not ratified).
